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Volumn 86, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 279-305

Monitoring: Which institutions matter?

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Institutional investors; Mergers and acquisitions; Monitoring; Trading

Indexed keywords


EID: 34948856433     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.005     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (1252)

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