The (willingly) fettered executive: Presidential spinoffs in national security domains and beyond

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 801-898

  Michaels, Jon D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 80051505312     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (408)

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2. Robert Maranto, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency 1-2 (2002)
3. Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government Govern? 267, 280 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989)
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10. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1995)
11. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 393, 393 (2008)
12. see also L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin, Introduction, in The Fettered Presidency 1, 1-2 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989)
13. see Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 1011, 50
14. see Daniel Guttman & Barry Willner, The Shadow Government 63-78, 151-52 (1976)
15. see also Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 333, 346-51 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010).
16. See, e.g., Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw & Phillip L. Harvey, America's Misunderstood Welfare State 57 (1990)
17. Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance 66 (1997)
18. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 244-47, 254 (1992) (legislative intent).
19. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1507, 1551-52, 1553-56 (2001)
20. see also Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 859, 861, 894-96 (2000)
21. Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in Organization Theory 116, 126-27 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995)
22. Terry M. Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 106, 126 (1991)
23. See Karen Breslau, Snooping Around the Valley: The CIA Sets up a High-Tech Investment Fund, Newsweek, Apr. 10, 2000, at 45;
24. Warren P. Strobel, The Spy Who Funded Me (and My Start-Up): The CIA's Venture Capitalist in Silicon Valley, U.S. News & World Rep., Jul. 17, 2000, at 38.
25. See Ken Dilanian, Overall U.S. Intelligence Spending Tops $80 Billion, L.A. Times, Oct. 29, 2010, at A6;
26. ; Walter Pincus, Intelligence Spending at Record $80.1 Billion Overall, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 2010 at A2.
27. Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law 384-429, 1037-50 (4th ed. 2007).
28. See generally James Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War (2010)
29. Jim Hougan, Spooks: The Haunting of America-the Private Use of Secret Agents 21 (1978)
30. Victor Marchetti & John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 5 (1974).
31. See Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. §§ 1-51 (2009)
32. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005);
33. see also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
34. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 5021, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 (2006).
35. see also Heather Timmons, Dubai Port Company Sells Its U.S. Holdings to A.I.G, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2006, at C4 (recounting the history of the Dubai Ports acquisition and subsequent sale in response to the political fallout from the acquisition).
36. See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 901, 901 (2008)
37. Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 951, 955 (2006).
38. See, e.g., Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (2007)
39. War, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 1001, 1004-05 (2004)
40. Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1435, 1435 (2010)
41. Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 989, 992 (2005)
42. Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 549, 549-50 (2005).
43. See James K. Jackson, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33388, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 14 (Feb. 4, 2010)
44. Edward M. Graham & David M. Marchick, US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment 128-35 (2006)
45. See James E. Westheider, The Vietnam War 86 (2007).(unpublished Master's thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology), available at http://oai.dtic.mil/ oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA423132).
46. That summer it changed its name to In-Q-Tel.
47. Josh Lerner et al., In-Q-Tel, Case 9- 804-146, at 8 (2004)
48. Omid Mashhadi et al., Chesapeake Crescent Initiative, In-Q-Tel as an Early Stage Investment Model 2 (2009)
49. Our Approach: Finding the Right Technology, In-Q-Tel, http://www.iqt.org/mission/our-approach.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
50. S.J. Ulvick & D.W. Tighe, In-Q-Tel, the Strategic Investment Firm for the U.S. Intelligence Community, 6954 Proc. SPIE 1, 1-2 (2008)
51. See Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire 145 (2008).
52. Wendy Molzahn, The CIA's In-Q-Tel Model: Its Applicability, Acquisition Rev. Q., Winter 2003, at 49;
53. cf. Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3173 (2010)
54. . See John D. Donahue, The Privatization Decision 107-08 (1989);
55. Peter Eisler, Government Funds Power Research, USA Today, Apr. 16, 2009, at 8A (describing the Army's "OnPoint Technologies")
56. Marc Kaufman, NASA Invests in Its Future with Venture Capital Firm, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 2006, at A19 (describing NASA's "Red Planet Capital")
57. see also Mary Prendergast, Spies on Sand Hill Road: The CIA's Venture Capital Fund 5-6 (May 7, 2010)
58. See Jonathan G.S. Koppel, The Challenge of Administration by Regulation: Preliminary Findings Regarding the U.S. Government's Venture Capital Funds, 9 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 641, 646-47 (1999)
59. See Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty 69, 77 n.100 (2007)
60. See John F. Frittelli, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31733, Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress 6-7 (2005).
61. See Alan P. Larson & David M. Marchick, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 18, Foreign Investment and National Security: Getting the Balance Right 20 (2006)
62. see also Arabian Dreams: The Emirate Has Too Much to Lose by Being a Security Risk, Economist, Mar. 4, 2006, at 70, 73
63. DP World's Long Shadow, Economist, June 16, 2007, at 74-75
64. Heather Timmons, Outside U.S., Puzzlement over Reaction to the Dubai Port Deal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2006, at C3
65. Stewart Baker, Skating on Stilts 244-50 (2010). As a side note, political pressure compelled Dubai Ports to sell its interest in the U.S. ports to the American International Group ("AIG").
66. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1
67. I am indebted to Jerry Kang for his article invoking the Trojan Horse metaphor in a legally salient context. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 (2005).
68. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 note (Supp. II 2009).
69. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990.
70. James K. Jackson, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33388, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 1 (Apr. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Jackson, Apr. 8, 2008].
71. ; Martin Tolchin, Bill Would Curb Foreign Companies in U.S. Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1988, at 1. José
72. The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, 69 (1989)
73. see also David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 81, 91 (2009)
74. Vito Tanzi & Isaias Coelho, Barriers to Foreign Investment in the U.S. and Other Nations, 516 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 154, 157 (1991)
75. William C. Rempel & Donna K. H. Walters, Trade War: When Chips Were Down, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1987, at 1.
76. Jackson, Feb. 4, 2010
77. Jackson, Apr. 8, 2008
78. see also Stuart Auerbach, U.S. May Halt Sale of Firm to Japanese: Deal for Chip Maker Raises Security Issues, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1986, at A1
79. Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 583, 609-10 (2007)
80. James Barron, Huge Japanese Realty Deals Breeding Jokes and Anger, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1989, at B1.
81. The Exon-Florio Amendment, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)
82. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
83. Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798
84. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 5021, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(d) (2006).
85. See Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 126 (3d ed. 1995);
86. But see Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2324-27 (2006)
87. see also Exec. Order No. 12,661
88. reprinted as amended in 3 C.F.R. 618 (1989).
89. Exec. Order No. 12,661
90. C.F.R. at 620.
91. FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(b)(1)(E).
92. FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(b)(1)(C)
93. J. Eugene Marans et al., Manual of Foreign Investment in the United States 11:4 (3d ed. 2004).
94. James K. Jackson, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22197, The Exon-Florio National Security Test for Foreign Investment 4 (Feb. 23, 2006).
95. James K. Jackson, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33312
96. The Exon-Florio National Security Test for Foreign Investment 5 (Apr. 8, 2008)
97. See Andrew Dowell & Shayndi Raice, Huawei Drops U.S. Deal Amid Opposition, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703407304576154121951088478.html.
98. FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(b)(2)(A)-(B).
99. FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(e)
100. United Arab Emirates: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 109th Cong. 20-21 (2006)
101. FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(m).
102. See generally Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 L. & Contemp. Probs. 205, 215-16 (1998)
103. FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170(f).
104. James Kanter, Shareholders in Paris Approve Merger of Alcatel and Lucent, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 2006, at C3;
105. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Security Rule Raises Takeovers Fear, Fin. Times, Dec. 5, 2006, at 6.
106. See Anthony Michael Sabino, Transactions That Imperil National Security, N.Y. St. B. Ass'n J., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 20, 22, 24.
107. See FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)
108. James K. Jackson, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33388
109. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), at 17 (Jul. 29, 2010)
110. C. S. Eliot Kang, U.S. Politics and Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, 51 Int'l Org. 301, 304 (1997)
111. see also Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., Annual Report to Congress 3 tbl.B-1 (2010)
112. American Criminal Procedure, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 223, 248-49 (2006)
113. See Alan G. Whittaker, et al., Research Report, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System 12-21 (2008)
114. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences 115, 115-34 (Michael Dowdle ed., 2006)
115. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2073, 2134 (2005)
116. quoting Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1260 (2003))) see also Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557
117. See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971)
118. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-35 (2007)
119. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing Political Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1128 (2010) (suggesting accountable administrative governance requires reason-giving by the president or other presidentially appointed source)
120. David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law 3 (2006);
121. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095, 1134-35 (2009).
122. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive 3-20 (2008)
123. See Michael Duffy, Getting Out the Wrecking Ball, Time, Dec. 19, 1994
124. Spencer S. Hsu & Susan B. Glasser, FEMA Director Singled Out by Response Critics, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 2005, at A1.
125. At the very least, one is reminded of the adage that one person's "red tape" is another's "accountability" safeguard. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 111, 153 (2005);
126. See, e.g., David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2-4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1675225.
127. See generally Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Law Concerns, in Government by Contract 153, 159-65 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009)
128. Joseph Summerill, Homeland Security's Not So Secret Weapon, Contract Management, Nov. 2002, at 32.
129. Compare Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Administrative Law 154, 779-80 (5th ed. 2003)
130. Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1285 (2003)
131. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859, 873-76 (2009)
132. Ginger Ann Wright, Procurement Authorities of the CIA, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1195, 1208-15 (2001)
133. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 449, 467 (1988)
134. see also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 421 (1997)
135. Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 873, 873 (2007)
136. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389, 415 (2003)
137. Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 397, 465-66 (2006)
138. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988)
139. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 601
140. employee complaints dismissed. See Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 347 (4th Cir. 2005).
141. Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and Choice, 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 321, 345 (2004)
142. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 575, 575 (2010)
143. Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Processes of Governance: Terror, the Rule of Law, Limits of Institutional Design, 22 Governance 353, 354 (2009)
144. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007)
145. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2663, 2663-64 (2005)
146. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1100-02 (2008)
147. See also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988)
148. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)
149. see also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
150. James A. Goldston et al., Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 409, 459-66 (1986)
151. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988);
152. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180-81 (1985)
153. See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3, 11 (2005)
154. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)
155. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010)
156. see also ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 687 (6th Cir. 2007)
157. see United States v. Reynolds, 354 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1953).
158. See I.R.C. 6104 (2006) (requiring tax-exempt organizations to file a Form 990, publicly disclosing the names and salaries of key employees).
159. David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government 83-84 (1992)
160. See Neil King, Jr., With a Nod To 007, the CIA Sets Up Firm to Invest in High Tech, Chi. Trib., Apr. 17, 2000, 7, at 36 (cataloging concerns and objections raised by members of Congress)
161. Terence O'Hara, In-Q-Tel, CIA's Venture Arm, Invests in Secrets, Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 2005, at D1 (noting critics' opposition to In-Q-Tel).
162. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, "Securing" the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 587, 640 (2009) (noting that institutional design is sometimes a reflection of "ideas that become fashionable- regardless of whether they advance political agendas or prescriptive goals").
163. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (2003). At the same time, another hot trend in the 1990s was the VC-Silicon Valley boom, which no doubt registered in Langley.
164. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing, The C.I.A.'s Travel Agent, New Yorker, Oct. 30, 2006, at 34 (reporting that "[m]ost of the planes used in rendition flights are owned and operated by tiny charter airlines that function as C.I.A. front companies" and that a division of Boeing "handle[s] many of the logistical and navigational details for these trips, including flight plans, clearance to fly over other countries, hotel reservations, and ground-crew arrangements").
165. See Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President, at xi (1985)
166. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency 14, 16, 185-88 (1987)
167. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation
168. J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 94-96 (1985)
169. Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181, 190 (1986)
170. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 488, 490 (1998)
171. see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250, 260 (2001)
172. (Scalia, J., dissenting); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
173. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 864-66 (1984)
174. see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151-54 (2010)
175. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-08 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1741, 1741-44 (2009)
177. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446, 2475 (2006)
178. Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the Separation of Powers, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 361, 400-01 (1993)
179. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1385, 1391-95 (2008)
180. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 1002-07 (1997)
181. Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 196-97 (1995)
182. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1253, 1265-77 (2009)
183. Lisa Shultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 613 (2010)
184. see also Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 465-66 (2008)
185. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865, 911 n.118 (2007).
186. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror, 61 Int'l Org. 9, 11, 27 (2007)
187. Jennifer Barrett, An Enormous Waste of Money, Newsweek.com (Mar. 17, 2004)
188. Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind 68 (2007)
189. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. Legal Stud. 433, 446-47 (1998)
190. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 546-48 (2000)
191. See Tiberiu Dragu & Mattias Polborn, Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability 9, 12, 26 (CESifo Working Paper No. 2864, 2009)
192. see also Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency 74-75 (2007)
193. Report of the Select Comm. On Intelligence on the Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rep.. 108-301, at 27-29 (2004)
194. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States 3-6, 9, 14-17 (2005)
195. See generally Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear 38 (2003)
196. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine 9 (2006)
197. See, for example, the In-Q-Tel website announcing strategic partnerships. About In-Q-Tel, Press Releases, In-Q-Tel, http://www.iqt.org/news-and-press/ press-releases/ index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2011)
198. See, e.g., Man on the Moon: Kennedy Speech Ignited a Dream, CNN.com (May 25, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-05-25/tech/kennedy.moon-1-single-space- project-apollospace- race?-s=PM:TECH.
199. Homeland Security Grant Program: State Allocations and Issues for Congressional Oversight 4, 9 (2004)
200. see The 9/11 Commission Report 395-96 (2004)
201. Kenneth R. Mayer, Electoral Cycles in Federal Government Prime Contract Awards: State-Level Evidence from the 1988 and 1992 Presidential Elections, 39 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 162, 164, 177, 180 (1995)
202. Walter R. Mebane, Jr. & Gregory J. Wawro, Presidential Pork Barrel Politics 4, 18-19 (July 13, 2002)
203. Boris Shor, Presidential Power and Distributive Politics: Federal Expenditures In the 50 States, 1983-2001, at 32 (January 26, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~bshor/research/presidency. distributive.politics.pdf).
204. See Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 827, 869 (1996)
205. See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 947, 952-53 (2003).
206. See The Directors, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-nation/history/ former-dcis-and-dcias.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
207. David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 Yale L.J. 548, 610 (2009)
208. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 913, 919 & n.23 (2009) (same).
209. See Off-the-record Telephone Interview with Y and Z by Jon D. Michaels, Acting Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law (Jan. 2011)
210. The effects here are no less binding. That said, because political accountability has perverse effects in this regulatory space, this act of binding might be far less pernicious. Cf. Lionel S. Sobel & Karen J. Mandel, "Let Them Watch Cable": Financing Public Television in the Wake of Federal Downsizing, Ent. & Sports L., Fall 1995, at 1, 26.
211. See Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound 1-6 (2000)
212. Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1038-40, 1042 (2007)
213. Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§ 2902-2904, 104 Stat. 1485, 1808-13 (codified at 10 U.S.C. 2687 note (2006))
214. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1263, 1283-300 (1992)
215. (describing the "problem of short-term managerial focus in American corporations," attributing it to "the legal and practical pressures on directors and managers to look exclusively to the interests of stockholders," and noting that it leads to a "managerial obsession with current profitability and stock price"); Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 Duke L.J. 1013, 1045-46 (2009)
216. (noting that compensation of corporate managers leads them to overemphasize short-term interests); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The New Theory of the Firm: Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 148, 148 (1990)
217. David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 439 (2010)
218. Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Op-Ed., Are Executives Paid Too Much?, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 2009
219. See, e.g., Susan A. Hill et al., Transferability of the Venture Capital Model to the Corporate Context: Implications for the Performance of Corporate Venture Units, 3 Strategic Entrepreneurship J. 3, 8, 21-22 (2009)
220. Robin Siegel et al., Corporate Venture Capitalists: Autonomy, Obstacles, and Performance, 3 J. Bus. Venturing 233, 238-46 (1988)
221. see also Ralph Biggadike, The Risky Business of Diversification, Harv. Bus. Rev., May/June 1979, at 103, 104.
222. see Philip M. Boffey, Small Agency Quietly Plays Powerful Role in Developing Exotic Research, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at C1
223. Robert O'Harrow Jr. U.S. Hopes to Check Computers Globally: System Would Be Used to Hunt Terrorists, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 2002, at A4
224. Walter Pincus, From Tiny Aircraft to Robots and Radars, Pentagon Pursues New Tools, Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1998, at A2
225. Walter Pincus, How Defense Research Is Making Troops More Effective in Wartime, Wash. Post, May 12, 2008, at A17
226. Michael Schrage, Pentagon Plans To Build Computers That See, Talk, and 'Think,' Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1983, at A1
227. Michael Schrage, Transporting the Pentagon into the Future, Wash. Post, Jul. 24, 1983, at F1
228. Tom Wicker, The High-Tech Future, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1990, at A25. But public access and media attention is a dual-edged sword. DARPA chiefs have been removed for pushing priorities that differed from the preferences of the Administration
229. see Lionel Barber, Industrial Policy Row Claims Victim: White House Removes Pentagon Agency Head, Fin. Times, Apr. 24, 1990 at 10, and of the Congress (and op-ed pundits).
230. See Shane Harris, The Watchers 236-48 (2010)
231. Bradley Graham, Poindexter Resigns but Defends Programs: Anti-Terrorism, Data Scanning Efforts at Pentagon Called Victims of Ignorance, Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 2003, at A2
232. Vernon Loeb, Pentagon Drops Bid For Futures Market, Wash. Post, Jul. 30, 2003, at A17.
233. cf. Dara K. Cohen, Mariano- Florentino Cuéllar & Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates
234. Stan. L. Rev. 673, 686-87 (2006) (describing intra-agency squabbles regarding what responsibilities within an agency receive more or fewer resources).
235. Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 587-91 (1984)
236. Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 470 (2003)
237. John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Formation of Government Contracts 261, 264-65 (3d ed. 1998).
238. see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 785-90 (1972)
239. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 312-30, 333-43 (1976).
240. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 208 (2006) (criminalizing self-dealing by government officials).
241. See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 627, 629-30 (2001)
242. see also Office of the Inspector General of the United States Department of Defense, Management Accountability Review of the Boeing KC-767A Tanker Program ii, May 13, 2005
243. See Jay Solomon, Investing in Intelligence: Spy Agencies Seek Innovation Through Venture-Capital Firm, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A4
244. see The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 6-7 (1949)
245. Peri Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency 3-4 (2d ed. 1998)
246. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations 329-40 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947)
247. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010)
248. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 note (1988)
249. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. 601 note (2006)
250. see also Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 824-27 (2003)
251. Terry Moe & Scott Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 18, 34-38 (1994)
252. see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat 2135
253. José D. Villalobos & Justin Vaughn, More Czars than the Romanovs? Obama's Czars in Historical and Legal Context, 1-3 (APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642679
254. Neil King, Role of White House Czars Sparks Battle, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 2009, at A4.
255. David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments 31, 34-35 (2008);
256. see also Paul Light, Thickening Government 7-13 (1995)
257. David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1128 (2008)
258. see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239-40 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
259. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 609-10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
260. (Scalia, J., dissenting); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170-71 (1803)
261. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 202-05, 235-36
262. See Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., A Role for Congress To Reclaim, Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 2009, at A15;
263. Aaron Saiger, Obama's "Czars" for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1, 16, 27, 29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719746).
264. White House Staff, 79 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1, 16, 27, 29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719746).
265. See FINSA, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 (2006)
266. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Op-Ed., You Can't Be CFIUS, Wall St. J., Jul. 13, 2006, at A8.
267. Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1655, 1677-78 (2006)
268. Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 274, 274-75 (2003) (same).
269. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1994).
270. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146-47 (2010)
271. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 716, 724 n.4 (1988)
272. (Scalia, J., dissenting); Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52, 106, 176 (1926).
273. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3170 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
274. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1288-89 (2008)
275. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Designs, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1789, 1840-43 (2010)
276. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1537, 1544 (9th Cir. 1993)
277. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 387-89, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
278. Ken Gormley, Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation 361-72 (1997)
279. Stanley I. Kutler, Wars of Watergate 406-11 (1990).
280. See Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 2007, (Magazine), at 40, 45
281. George W. Bush, Decision Points 172-74 (2010).
282. See Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon's Shadow, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1405, 1412 (1999)
283. Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks 116 (2005)
284. See generally Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52
285. Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443, 462 (1987)
286. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State, 51 Duke L.J. 963, 1003-10 (2001)
287. Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 93-95 (2008).
288. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1545 (1993)
289. see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 264, 267-68 (1954)
290. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
291. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1786-88 (2007)
292. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943, 944 (1980)
293. 272Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 299, 333 (1991)
294. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 42-45 (2009).
295. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear 3-5 (2005)
296. Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe:Risk and Response 12-14 (2004)
297. Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. Risk & Uncertainty 121, 122, 133 (2003)
298. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting an FDA decision to limit availability of the Plan B contraceptive on the ground that the agency succumbed to White House and constituent-group pressure)
299. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti- Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2077-78 (2005)
300. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007);
301. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
302. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
303. Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders"-The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 821 (2008)
304. Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 763
305. Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 599, 603 (1997).
306. Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 430 (2009)
307. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1515 (1992
308. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1678 (1975).
309. Luis Garicano & Richard A. Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organiza tional Economics Perspective, 19 J. Econ. Perspectives 151, 157 (2005).
310. See generally Paul 't Hart, Groupthink in Government 31-40 (1990)
311. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 233-34 (2d ed. 1982)
312. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 143-44 (2003)
313. Yale L.J. 71, 75, 85-95 (2000
314. See, e.g., Select Comm. on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rep. No. 108-301, at 18, 21, 24 (2004)
315. See William Morrow, Congressional Committees 241 (1969)
316. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 793 (1983)
317. See Karen M. Hult, Agency Merger and Bureaucratic Redesign 8 (1987) (noting that interest groups are more likely to capture one agency than multiple agencies);
318. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 12-13 (1996)
319. see also Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004
320. See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 211-14
321. See David S. Cloud & David E. Sanger, Action on Port Deals Fails to Sway Critics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2006, at A10
322. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, How a Business Deal Became a Big Liability for Republicans in Congress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2006, at A14 (same)
323. Jonathan Weisman, Port Deal to Have Broader Review: Dubai Firm Sought U.S. Security Probe, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 2006, at A1
324. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-73 (1970)
325. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 75 (1961) (concluding that the political question doctrine is a prudential doctrine)
326. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 191 (2007)
327. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text 160 (1959)
328. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1063-70 (2005).
329. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, 9, cl. 2
330. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993)
331. Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1977)
332. Cf. Chadha v. INS, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983)
333. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926)
334. see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406-07 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
335. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 41, 47 (1975)
336. United States ex. rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-67 (1954)
337. Portland Audubon 984 F.3d at 1538
338. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
339. Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 227, 233-34 (1998).
340. Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 607, 616 n.39 (2009).
341. Cases such as Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. at 266-67
342. Myers, 272 U.S. at 135
343. Londoner v. Denver 210 U.S. 373 385 (1908)
344. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 135
345. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
346. See Eric Lipton, Chinese Withdraw Offer for Nevada Gold Concern, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2009, at B3
347. Memorandum from Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP to Northwest Non- Ferrous Int'l Co. and Firstgold Corp. 3-4 (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/memo-regarding-thesale- of-firstgold-corp/original.pdf.
348. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L.J. 257, 260-61
349. see also Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1993)
350. See William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 36- 41, 195-200 (1971)
351. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy 260-61 (1989)
352. see Darryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 933 (2005)
353. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-55 (2007)
354. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44, 57 (1983)
355. cf. Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 Pub. Choice 33, 33-38, 55-60 (1982)
356. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1036, 1043-59 (2006
357. See e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
358. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1272, 1302-04 (2002).
359. See generally State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)
360. See Matthias Busse & Carsten Hefeker, Political Risk, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment, 23 Euro. J. Pol. Econ. 397, 407 (2007)
361. Hans-Peter Lankes & A.J. Venables, Foreign Direct Investment in Economic Transition, 4 Econ. of Transitions 331, 346 (1996)
362. Friedrich Schneider & Bruno S. Frey, Economic and Political Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, 13 World Dev. 161, 161, 173 (1985) (same)
363. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm., U.S. Capital Markets in the Post- Sarbanes Oxley World: Markets Should Matter to Foreign Issuers, Remarks before the London School of Economics (Jan. 25, 2005)
364. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 17, 21 (2001)
365. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. Legal Stud. 433, 449-53 (1998)
366. See generally Michael Petrusic, Recent Developments, Oil and National Security: CNOOC's Failed Bid to Purchase Unocal, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1373 (2006).
367. see Jim VandeHei & Paul Blustein, Bush's Response to the Ports Deal Faulted as Tardy: By the Time President's Political Team Took Notice, Controversy Was an Uproar, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2006, at A5
368. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Panel Saw No Security Issue in Port Contract, Officials Say, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1.
369. REAL ID Act of 2005 102, 8 U.S.C. §1103 note (2006)
370. A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 Va. Envtl. L.J. 105, 110-20 (2007);
371. Kerry Rodgers, The Limits of Collaborative Governance: Homeland Security and Environmental Protection at U.S. Ports, 25 Va. Envtl. L.J. 157, 162, 209-10, (2007).
372. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 838 (2004).
373. See Frank Gottron, Cong. Research Serv., RS 21507, Project BioShield: Purposes and Authorities 1 (Jul. 6, 2009)
374. See Bioshield Act 2, 42 U.S.C. 247d-6a(b), (c), (e) (2006).
375. REAL ID Act 102, 8 U.S.C. 1103 note (2006)
376. Webster v. Doe; 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988)
377. See BioShield Act 2, 42 U.S.C. 247d-6a(b), (e) (2006).
378. Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 357, 359.
379. See Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 573, 629-33 (2004)
380. See M. Elizabeth Magill, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 126, 126 (2006) 353
381. see also Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-32 (1935)
382. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943
383. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 590-92 (D.C. Cir. 1970
384. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959
385. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
386. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
387. Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in Congress: Structure and Policy 409-10
388. see, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy 83 (2007)
389. Steven D. Zansberg, Note, "Objectivity and Balance" in Public Broadcasting: Unwise, Unworkable, and Unconstitutional, 12 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 184, 184 (1994)
390. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 201, 47 U.S.C. 396 (2006)
391. see also Glenn J. McLoughlin, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22168, The Corporation for Public Broadcasting: Federal Funding Facts and Status 1-2 (June 1, 2007), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/ 4149-Previous-Version-2007-06-01.pdf.
392. See About CPB, Purpose and History of CPB's Advance Appropriations, Center for Public Broadcasting, http://www.cpb.org/appropriation/purpose.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
393. Pub L. No. 101-510, §§ 2902-2903, 104 Stat. 1485, 1808-12 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)
394. The process is succinctly explained in Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 464-65 (1994).
395. See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by ommission, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 331, 337 (1991)
396. Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective Dilemmas Through Delegation, 20 Leg. Stud. Q. 393, 393-94 (1995).
397. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-30, 2, 110 Stat. 1200, 1200-11, codified at 2 U.S.C. 691-691f (Supp. III 1998), invalidated by Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)
398. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16-23 (1962)
399. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)
400. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
401. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1976)
402. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975)
403. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
404. See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Origins of the APA, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 180, 183-89 (1999)
405. cf. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 971, 974 (2009)
406. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation, 19 L & Pol'y 363, 390-91 (1997).
407. Mitchel V. Abolafia, Self-Regulation as Market Maintenance, in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 312, 341 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985).
408. Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 672 (2011)