Our Schmittian administrative law

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 122, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1095-1149

  Vermeule, Adrian ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 61849136231     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (303)

1. 5 U.S.C. §§551-559, 701-706 (2006).
2. Law Lord Johan Steyn coined the term "legal black hole," Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004),
3. and David Dyzenhaus coined the term legal "grey hole," DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006).
4. DYZENHAUS, supra note 2, at 3.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 42.
7. Id. at 3.
8. By "administrative law," I mean the administrative law of the federal government of the United States. I focus on the post-9/11 period and on emergencies implicating national security, rather than on economic emergencies or on emergencies arising from natural disasters or environmental change. (By "emergencies," then, I mean security emergencies unless otherwise specified.) Many of the points I will make apply in those other settings as well, although some do not. For an account of Schmitt's thinking about economic emergencies, see William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869, 1882-91 (2000);
9. for some similarities and differences between security emergencies and economic emergencies, see Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 546-52 (2007).
10. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (rebuking the D.C. Circuit for imposing heightened procedural requirements on agencies without statutory warrant).
11. Schmitt was a prominent legal theorist and public intellectual of the Weimar Republic, and did most of his important work between 1918 and 1933. During the Weimar period he was an ally of conservative forces opposed to the more radical Nazis, but he joined the Nazi party when it came to power in 1933 and became for a time one of its leading jurists. He fell from grace in 1936, after elements of the party accused him (quite plausibly) of opportunism. See generally JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT THEORIST FOR THE REICH 222-42 (1983);
12. ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: CARL SCHMITT IN WEIMAR 11-37 (2004). Schmitt's writings that I cite and draw upon here all predate his switch to Nazism, but in any case, his ideas must be judged on their intellectual merits.
13. For useful introductions to and perspectives on Schmitt, see generally KENNEDY, supra note 9;
14. LAW AS POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998) [hereinafter LAW AS POLITICS];
15. and WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT THE END OF LAW (1999).
16. Schmitt lays out his theory in CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE (1928),
17. recently translated by Jeffrey Seitzer, see CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2008) (1928).
18. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., MIT Press 1985) (2d ed. 1934).
19. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922).
20. For present purposes I take what follows as a fair reading of Schmitt, although it may owe more to the larger body of post-9/11 commentary that has extrapolated from and (no doubt) modified Schmitt's ideas.
21. See Richard Wolin, Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism, and the Total State, 19 THEORY & SOC'Y 389, 396-97 (1990).
22. See generally CARL SCHMITT, DIE DIKTATUR: VON DEN ANFÄNGEN DES MODERNEN SOUVERÄNITÄTSGEDANKENS BIS ZUM PROLETARISCHEN KLASSENKAMPF (1921).
23. John P. McCormick, The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers, in LAW AS POLITICS, supra note 10, at 217, 220.
24. Id. at 218-19.
25. Id. at 223-24.
26. SCHMITT, supra note 13, at 5.
27. Schmitt focused on the fundamental absence of constraints on executive power, but it is only a short extension of his thought to find procedural constraints on executive power to be infirm. See Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39, 48-49 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
28. But cf. William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 61, 65-66 (2006) (arguing that, while a determinative substantive definition of emergency could be impossible, procedures for deciding the existence of an emergency may be successful and sustainable).
29. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 47
30. (citing Louis M. Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441 (2004)).
31. For the suggestion that this rendition is actually more radical than Schmitt's own view, see Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 73 n.52. I state these views for completeness, but nothing on my thesis turns on how exactly this exegetical disagreement should be resolved.
32. See SCHMITT, supra note 13, at 7.
33. See, e.g., GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) (2003);
34. William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, 13 CONSTELLATIONS 108 (2006);
35. Scheuerman, supra note 20.
36. Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 65.
37. See, e.g., DYZENHAUS, supra note 2, at 18.
38. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969) (1964).
39. See David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2026 (2006) ("[G]rey holes are more harmful to the rule of law than black holes.").
40. See generally id.
41. Id. at 2029.
42. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 519-21 (2005);
43. Peter Raven-Hansen, Detaining Combatants by Law or by Order? The Rule of Lawmaking in the War on Terrorists, 64 LA. L. REV. 831, 843-50 (2004) .
44. See supra p. 1100.
45. See Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 65.
46. As Bernadette Meyler rightly pointed out to me, Schmitt tends to write as though exceptions are determined by a single sovereign, rather than jointly by a system composed of multiple actors. Whatever Schmitt's assumptions, however, I do not see that such a restriction is integral to the logic of his views. Everything that Schmitt says about emergencies, exceptions, and sovereignty could apply just as well to, say, a triumvirate or a small ruling junta. If so, then the further extension to a complex administrative state is unobjectionable, although the difference in institutions will of course create pragmatic differences. As I discuss in Part III, moreover, the pragmatic circumstances of the modern administrative state actually strengthen Schmitt's argument. For an overview of attempts by German legal theorists of the 1930s and 1940s to reconcile the administrative or welfare state with a strong commitment to the rule of law, see WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1994). My argument in Part III is that any project of subjecting the administrative state to full legality is doomed to fail, at least in the American case, and probably more generally.
47. Dyzenhaus, supra note 27, at 2029.
48. See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
49. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
50. Id. § 551(1);
51. see also id. § 701(b)(1) (providing a nearly identical definition of "agency" for purposes of the APA's judicial review provisions).
52. See id. § 551(1).
53. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994);
54. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
55. See, e.g., Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-01 ("Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, . . . [w]e would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.").
56. See id.
57. Dalton, 511 U.S. 462.
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 55 (1)(F)-(G).
59. See, e.g., McKinney v. White, 291 F.3d 851, 854-55 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reading the exclusion of "courts martial and military commissions" from the definition of "agency" in the APA's judicial review provisions, 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(F), to preclude judicial review of Judge Advocate General's denial of request to set aside the verdict of a court martial);
60. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the "military authority" exception to agency review did not apply where a claim "entail[ed] no judicial interference with the relationship between soldiers and their military superiors").
61. 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
62. See Bismullah, 514 F.3d at 1303 n.3 (Randolph, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (joined by Judges Sentelle, Henderson, and Kavanaugh).
63. See id. at 1305-06 (Randolph, J., addendum to dissent).
64. Id. at 1294 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (joined by Judges Rogers, Tatel, and Griffith);
65. see also id. at 1294 n.3.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6).
67. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
68. Id. at 62
69. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (emphasis added)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 64
72. (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
73. See id. at 62 ("[The relevant APA provisions] all insist upon an 'agency action,' either as the action complained of . . . or as the action to be compelled . . . ."). This point is not affected by the Court's brief gesture toward a distinction between agency "denial" of requested action and agency "failure to act."
74. See id. at 63.
75. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1475 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated and rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
76. 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cerl, denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008).
77. Id. at 678.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 678-79.
80. The definition of "order" as "the whole or a part of a final disposition," 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2006) (emphasis added), suggests that orders require adjudication, and the definition of "adjudication" as "agency process for the formulation of an order," id. § 551(7), similarly suggests that orders are the products of adjudication.
81. See also Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and Courts - Except When They're Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 98 (2007) ("[U]nless the final product of an agency action is a rule, it must be an order, which is the product of an adjudication.").
82. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2006) (rulemaking);
83. id. § 554(a)(4) (adjudication).
84. See S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 13 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, at 185, 199 (1946);
85. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26-27 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL] (rulemaking);
86. id. at 45 (adjudication).
87. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated and rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
88. See Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 1982);
89. Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981);
90. Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1980).
91. 57 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995).
92. Id. at 770.
93. 321 F.3d 230 (1st Cir. 2003).
94. See id. at 233 (explaining that a rule establishing a temporary security zone was "well within the concept of military function").
95. But see United States v. Mulero-Joubert, 289 F.3d 168, 171 (ist Cir. 2002) (assuming arguendo that the military or "good cause" exceptions applied in a similar case, but reversing conviction on other grounds).
96. Ventura-Melendez, 321 F.3d at 233.
97. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2006).
98. Id. § 701(a)(2).
99. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
100. Id. at 410
101. (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945),
102. reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, supra note 62, at 185, 212) (internal quotation mark omitted).
103. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
104. Cf., e.g., Dep't of Navyv. Egan, 484 U.S. 518(1988).
105. 359 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 158.
107. Id. at 158, 171.
108. 428 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 2005).
109. Id. at 918.
110. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 113(a), 115 Stat. 597, 622 (2001).
111. Merida Delgado, 428 F.3d at 920.
112. For another application of this exception, see Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2003), which found that an FAA decision to renew an inspector's license was committed to agency discretion.
113. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
114. Merida Delgado, 428 F.3d at 920.
115. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
116. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297-98 (2001) (finding statute that repealed judicial review over certain INS actions insufficient to withdraw habeas corpus jurisdiction);
117. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).
118. Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in U.S. Federal Administrative Law, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MARK ARONSON 45 (Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow & Michael Taggart eds., 2008);
119. see also, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2006) (providing that if no action is available under the APA, the challenger may employ "any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction").
120. 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
121. Id. at 474.
122. See, e.g., Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reviewing dismissal of challenge to presidential designations of national monuments under the Antiquities Act);
123. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same);
124. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (allowing review of executive order governing federal contracting).
125. See Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting challenge to presidential determination not to grant import relief to domestic industry under U.S.-China Relations Act).
126. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("We have previously, and repeatedly . . . [held] that the 'APA's waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or not.'"
127. (quoting Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1328)).
128. See Griffith v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 842 F.2d 487, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
129. (citing Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), and describing the "Leedom v. Kyne" exception).
130. See Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying ultra vires standard because Library of Congress is not an "agency" under the APA).
131. For the Supreme Court jurisprudence on which this kind of nonstatutory review is based - which predates the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) - see Leedom, 358 U.S. at 188,
132. which provided limited review where an agency acts "contrary to a specific prohibition" that is "clear and mandatory", and Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1949).
133. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
134. See Dyzenhaus, supra note 27, at 2026.
135. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 30, at 519-21;
136. Raven-Hansen, supra note 30, at 843-50.
137. The term "soft look" first appeared in a judicial opinion in 1983. See KCST-TV, Inc. v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1185, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
139. Id. at 43
140. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962);
141. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
142. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1707 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
143. 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
144. Id. at 162.
145. Id.
146. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9.
147. 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
148. Id. at 734.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)E) (2006).
150. See Citizens To Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971).
151. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
152. 497 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2007).
153. Id. at 266.
154. Id. at 265-66.
155. Id. at 267.
156. Id. at 268.
157. Id. at 269.
158. Id.
159. (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
161. Id. § 553(b)(3)(B).
162. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 62, at 30.
163. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 14 (1945),
164. reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, supra note 62, at 200.
165. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (lapsed 1974).
166. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627.
167. See, e.g., Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
168. Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act's "Good Cause" Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 121 (1984) (footnotes omitted);
169. see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 610 F.2d 796 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979).
170. 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
171. See also Fed. Express Corp. v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 112, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding final Department of Transportation rules, promulgated with only partial notice-and-comment procedures, regarding compensation to air carriers that had incurred losses resulting from the 9/11 attacks).
172. Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1177.
173. Id. at 1179 (quoting TSA determination) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id.
175. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 62, at 30-31.
176. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
177. Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1179 (quoting respondents) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
179. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
180. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
181. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005);
182. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003).
183. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
184. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006);
185. cf., e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (asserting an impact of ideology on the outcomes of D.C. Circuit cases).
186. 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
187. Id. at 1381.
188. Id. at 1382.
189. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Navy's need to continue routine exercises did not constitute "emergency circumstances"), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008);
190. Nelson v. NASA, 512 F.3d 1134, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the government's broad reading of a provision authorizing actions "deemed in the interest of national security").
191. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
192. McAllister v. Att'y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 187 (3d Cir. 2006).
193. Cleveland Nat'l Air Show, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 430 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2005).
194. Compare id., with Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 166 (2d. Cir. 2004) (dismissing petition by plaintiffs seeking to force the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to create a no-fly zone around nuclear plants, on the ground that the issue is "committed to agency discretion by law" (internal quotation mark omitted)).
195. Newton v. FAA, 457 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2006).
196. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (identifying many unresolved questions about the Chevron doctrine).
197. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000).
198. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005);
199. Daniel J. Freeman, Note, The Canons of War, 117 YALE L.J. 280(2007).
200. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007);
201. Sunstein, supra note 151.
202. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2683, 2692-94 (2005);
203. Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007).
204. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
205. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
206. See, e.g., Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
207. Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007);
208. Karpova v. Snow, 497 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2007).
209. 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
210. Id. at 64 n.2 (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
211. But see Jinks & Katyal, supra note 153 (arguing that Chevron deference should apply to agencies but not the President).
212. 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
213. Id. at 750.
214. Id. (quoting International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
215. Id. at 752-53.
216. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 539 (1983) ("To delve into the structure, purpose, and legislative history of the original statute is to engage in a sort of creation... [for which] the court has no authority....").
217. Global Relief, 315 F.3d at 753.
218. Id.
219. See Holy Land Found, for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162-63 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
220. See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427 (1997).
221. For an overview of the issues and literature, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008).
222. 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
223. Id. at 92.
224. See id. at 96-97.
225. Id. at 97 ("A crucial aspect of the new 'primary mission' of CBP is to 'prevent terrorist attacks within the United States'...." (quoting 6 U.S.C. § III(b)(1) (2006))).
226. Id. (quoting Tabbaa v. Chertoff, No. 05-CV-582S, 2005 WL 3531828, at *i6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.). I take this quote from John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1556 n.48 (2008).
228. See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron As a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007);
229. Manning, supra note 174, at 1562-66.
230. See sources cited supra note 140.
231. See Steyn, supra note 2.
232. See id. at 11.
233. See supra p. 1102.
234. A related point, which I owe to Jack Beermann (and which Dyzenhaus does not make), is that grey holes conceal judicial discretion behind a façade of formalism, understanding formalism in terms of Karl Llewellyn's distinction between the "grand style" and the "formal style" of judicial opinion-writing.
235. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950).
236. A subtle exploration of these issues is David A. Strauss, Do It But Don't Tell Me (Sept. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
237. See supra pp. 1099-1100.
238. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008);
239. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
240. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 919-20 (1991).
241. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240 (Kennedy, J.) (reserving questions about the reach of habeas);
243. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (advocating an approach that "would avoid creating automatic statutory authority to adjudicate the claims of persons located outside the United States").
244. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275.
245. KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 310 (2008) (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
246. See infra section IV.B.
247. See Scheuerman, supra note 7, at 1884-85.
248. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
249. See generally Beermann, supra note 87 (noting that U.S. federal administrative law combines pockets of judge-made law with pockets of statutory law).
250. See, e.g., DYZENHAUS, supra note 2, at 47-48.
251. Id. at 61-62.
252. Mark Tushnet, Book Review, 2007 PUB. L. 604, 605 (reviewing DYZENHAUS, supra note 2).
253. See Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 392-95, 2007 SCC 9 (Can.) (praising the SIRC).
254. For other criticisms of this part of Dyzenhaus's account, see Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 64 n.13 (citing sources).
255. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
256. See Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World War II and the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II, at 185, 196-201 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002).
257. See id.
258. Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
259. Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
260. See generally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008).
261. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
262. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004).
263. For a related view, see Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47.
264. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 15-18 (2007).
265. But see Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005).
266. On statutory prohibitions bearing on the President's power as Commander in Chief, see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the lowest Ebb -Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008).
267. For example, Issacharoff and Pildes cite Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), as examples of the Supreme Court requiring congressional approval of executive action in wartime.
268. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 204, at 18, 26.
269. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 205, at 48-53.
270. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999).
271. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Essay, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004).
274. In preliminary work, Professor Cass Sunstein has made several tentative findings, based on a modest sample of no federal appellate cases involving national security decided after 9/11. The sample includes criminal as well as administrative cases, so it is not directly on point for my discussion, but it is sufficiently close to be worth mentioning. The findings relevant here are as follows: First, Democratic and Republican judges are both highly deferential to the executive in such cases; the rate of invalidation of government action is "lower... than in almost all other domains of federal law." Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Second, Republican judges are more likely to defer to the government in national security cases than are Democratic judges; there is a discernible partisan difference, comparable to other areas of law.
275. See id. at 7. Third, there is no evidence that the rate of deference in these cases has decreased as time has passed since 9/11.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV 1749, 1761 (2007) ("In addition to promoting rationality, the hard look doctrine promoted participation by encouraging agencies to respond to criticisms and show why they had rejected alternative solutions.").
278. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997).
279. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 440 & n.277 (2000).
280. For studies of the possible ossification effect of internal Office of Management and Budget review, generally finding that the effect is small, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 84-85 (2006).
281. See Jon Elster, Comments on the Paper by Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 240 (2004).
282. See Matthew Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469 (2007).
283. For an example of this argument, see David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359 (2007).
284. Id. at 1399 n.167 (quoting Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Greene, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
285. accord id. at 1399-403.
286. See generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 205.
287. SCHMITT, supra note 13, at 15.
288. vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
289. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
290. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543, 548.
291. See id. at 525 ("[The lower court] seriously misread or misapplied this statutory and decisional law cautioning reviewing courts against engrafting their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by Congress.").
292. See Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418 (1981).
293. See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978).
294. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-44 (1983).
295. But see Bait. Gas & Elec. Co v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983).
296. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549 ("The court should engage in this kind of review and not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good.").
297. Compare the idea that "the existence of indeterminate review doctrines, particularly the requirement of 'adequate reasons,' facilitates activist review in administrative law. When an indeterminate review doctrine is used, the judge is less susceptible to criticism that he or she has acted in a result-oriented manner." Sidney A. Shapiro, Substantive Reform, Judicial Review, and Agency Resources: OSHA as a Case Study, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 64s, 656 (1997) (footnote omitted). The idea is consistent with - indeed it is the flip side of - my suggestion here. The parameters of administrative law can be dialed up (as in hard look review after Vermont Yankee) or dialed down, and in either case it is difficult for reviewing courts and outside monitors to pinpoint a legal error.
298. See Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 707 (2005) ("If federal judges are going to reject a presidential decision in the name of liberty, they will have to demonstrate a great deal of courage. Lower courts, precisely because they are lower, are less likely to show that courage.").
299. See, e.g., Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (5-5 split on whether to grant rehearing en banc);
300. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008);
301. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
302. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
303. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).