Politics and the suboptimal provision of counterterror

International Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 9-36

  De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947366896     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818307070087     Document Type: Review

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