Chevron's Consensus

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 88, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1271-1325

  Criddle, Evan J ^a  

^a National Institute of Disability Rehabilitation and Research

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EID: 58149289866     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (420)

1. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
2. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006);
3. see also STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 289 (5th ed. 2002) (observing that Chevron has been cited more times than Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, and Marbury v. Madison combined).
4. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2297-2301 (2006) (inherent executive power);
5. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002) (administrative expertise);
6. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (congressional delegation);
7. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 87 (1994) (agency deliberative rationality);
8. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases] (concerns for national regulatory uniformity);
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 yALE L.J. 2580, 2587 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury] (the executive branch's political responsiveness and accountability).
10. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3, 340, 508-10 (1971) [hereinafter Rawls, A Theory of Justice]. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM];
11. John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233 (1989) [hereinafter Rawls, Domain]. This Article does not defend Rawls's vision of liberal political legitimacy per se, nor does it aspire to establish the political legitimacy of Chevron's revolution from the perspective of Rawlsian political liberalism or any other comprehensive theory.
12. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-38 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING].
13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839 (1984).
14. Chevron's consensus differs from Rawls's paradigmatic "overlapping consensus" inasmuch as Chevron's domain is defined by agency decision-making processes rather than an abstract political conception of the public good. As will be shown in Part II, however, Chevron also transcends Sunstein's paradigmatic "incompletely theorized agreement" because the Supreme Court has implicitly embraced several discrete rationales within Chevron's consensus as trans-procedural requirements for Chevron deference. Rather than attempt to define and defend a third modality of pragmatic consensus in contradistinction to Rawls and Sunstein, I will simply refer to Chevron's overlapping rationales throughout this Article as "Chevron's consensus."
15. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
16. Id. at 229.
17. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1475 (2005) [hereinafter Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled];
18. Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 792 (2002);
19. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2603 ("In Mead and similar cases, why is the refusal to defer to the executive the most sensible fiction, that is, the most reasonable instruction to attribute to Congress?").
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
22. See id. at 140 (evaluating whether an agency statutory interpretation merits deference based upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control").
23. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 289.
24. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 384-85 (4th ed. 2004).
25. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726-27 (D.C Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 837(1984).
26. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
27. Id. at 844.
28. Id. at 843-44.
29. Id. at 865 (citations omitted).
30. Id.
31. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2596 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819));
32. see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 976 (1992) ("Justice Stevens's opinion contained several features that can only be described as 'revolutionary,' even if no revolution was intended at the time." (citation omitted)).
33. See, e.g., Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2006);
34. John S. Kane, Refining Chevron - Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 532 n.102 (2008).
35. See, e.g., Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that Chevron deference should not be subject to proposed exceptions for the strict interpretation of criminal and deportation statutes);
36. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 469 (1996).
37. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 651 (2000);
38. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1170 (2007) (arguing that the impact of Chevron on executive power has "many implications for legal issues raised by the war on terror, including those explored in the Hamdi and Hamdan cases");
39. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2663-64 (2005). But see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1230 (2007) (disputing Chevron's applicability to foreign relations law generally);
40. Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927-28 (2003) (disputing Chevron's applicability to treaty interpretation).
41. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) (characterizing Chevron as evolutionary since it only "remind[ed] lower federal courts of their obligation to defer to an agency's reasonable construction of any statutes administered by that agency").
42. See Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO.L.REV. 129, 131 (1993) (arguing that "Chevron's importance has been exaggerated").
43. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984);
44. see, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (observing that courts "must reject administrative constructions of the statute ... that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate"); Office Employees Int'1 Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1957) (rejecting an agency statutory interpretation based on "the clear expression of the Congress to the contrary").
45. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11; Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 42-43 (inferring from "the absence of a prohibition on the agency arrangements at issue" and "the lack of a clearly enunciated legislative purpose to that effect" that the FEC's statutory interpretation was not "contrary to law"); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975);
46. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (stating that the task of interpreting the term "employee" in the National Labor Relations Act "has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act" and must be affirmed "if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law").
47. Hickman, supra note 23, at 1578.
48. See Starr, supra note 26, at 284.
49. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
50. Id. at 839.
51. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall Papers, [1993] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,606, 10,613 (reviewing Justice Marshall's private papers and suggesting that the Justices did not focus on Chevron's precedential impact upon statutory interpretation generally);
52. see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 838 (explaining that Chevron first achieved prominence in the lower courts).
53. See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 103 n.6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is, of course, of no importance that [an opinion] predates Chevron .... As we made clear in Chevron, the interpretive maxims summarized therein were 'well-settled principles.'" (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845));
54. Hickman, supra note 23, at 1578. It should probably come as no surprise, therefore, that for several subsequent terms the Supreme Court cited Chevron only irregularly and interchangeably with other precedents.
55. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64 (stating that agencies must consider "varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis").
56. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (stating that "considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily ... in statutory construction," since Congress may simply modify the statute if they disagree with the Court).
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
58. Id. at 863.
59. Id. at 863-64.
60. Id. at 864
61. Id. at 856.
62. Id. at 863-65.
63. Id. at 844.
64. Id. at 863-64.
65. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding the court is "impelled by the force of our precedent" in determining that the "regulatory change ... is impermissible"), rev'd, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
66. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855-56.
67. Id. at 855.
68. 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
69. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
70. See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 402;
71. ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 329 (rejecting the bubble concept as applied to the 1977 Amendments).
72. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981).
73. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("This court's prior adjudications in Alabama Power and ASARCO preclude us from sanctioning EPA's employment of the bubble concept in the Clean Air Act's nonattainment program."), rev'd, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).
75. 5 45 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (holding that Chevron deference applies to the FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act).
76. Id. at 981-82 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996));
77. see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Where Chevron applies, statutory ambiguities remain ambiguities subject to the agency's ongoing clarification. They create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency discretion.").
78. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83.
79. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I know of no case, in the entire history of the federal courts, in which we have allowed a judicial interpretation of a statute to be set aside by an agency - or have allowed a lower court to render an interpretation of a statute subject to correction by an agency.");
80. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941-56 (1992) (arguing that Chevron undermines the ideal of stability in statutory interpretation);
81. Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1430 (2005).
82. Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 23, at 1548 ("The more revolutionary... aspect of Chevron is its call for strong, mandatory deference... where Congress implicitly delegates rulemaking authority through the combination of statutory ambiguity and administrative responsibility, as exemplified by the Clean Air Act and the EPA.").
86. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 327 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
87. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
88. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
89. Id. at 231;
90. see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) ("[T]he Act commits [statutory interpretation] in the first instance to the Attorney General and his delegates, and their construction... should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute."); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975);
91. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961) (citing Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1904)).
92. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 845;
94. see also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) ("It is thus evident that Congress made a conscious decision to continue its delegation to the Board of the primary responsibility of marking out the scope of the statutory language and of the statutory duty to bargain.").
95. CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (quoting Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988)). The congressional delegation theory begs the question, moreover, whether "congressional intent" is itself a coherent concept.
96. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 ("Although Congress has broad power to decide what kind of judicial review should apply to what kind of administrative decision, Congress so rarely discloses (or, perhaps, even has) a view on this subject as to make a search for legislative intent chimerical and a conclusion regarding that intent fraudulent in the mine run of cases.");
97. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) ("That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition.").
98. Merrill, supra note 22, at 995;
99. see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003) ("[C]ongressional silence often reflects an expectation that courts will look to the common law to fill gaps in statutory text....").
100. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000);
101. see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 11 TEX. L. REV. 113, 194-95 (1998) (observing that "commentators in administrative law have 'generally acknowledged' that [the APA] seems to require de novo review on questions of law");
102. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 865;
103. Panel Discussion, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 368 (1987) (comments of Cass Sunstein) ("If there's any evidence of congressional views in the meantime, those views are very much in accord with the original spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act, that is, that administrative agency interpretations of law should not be deferred to.").
104. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (stating that Congress is aware that its statutory ambiguities "will be resolved by the implementing agency").
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944);
106. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
107. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986).
108. Starr, supra note 26, at 309-10;
109. see also Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 774-75 (1991) ("Once the issue is shifted to one of means, expertise is reflected primarily in the assessment of the likely outcomes of policy alternatives. Such assessments should be entitled to deference....");
110. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 574 (1985) (arguing that "interpretive expertise might be based on any one of three possible grounds: (1) access to greater knowledge or evidence of statutory meaning; (2) an interpretive process better suited to yielding correct solutions; or (3) motivation by a set of preferences more conducive to accurate identification of statutory meaning").
111. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863, 865 (1984).
112. Id. at 865.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 754.
116. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683-87 (1975);
117. see also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 (2002) ("[T]he legal realists' hope that legal ambiguities could be resolved by objective policy expertise has long ago grown quaint.... In practice, it is rare to find a field of social policy where there are not experts on opposing sides of an issue..., undermining any claim to an objective expert resolution.").
118. See HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER 58-66 (5th ed. 1998).
119. See, e.g., Editorial, Censorship on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at Al (describing the EPA's censorship of a scientific report);
120. Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al;
121. Jeremy Symons, How Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B04; Julie Rovner, Ex-Surgeon General Says Administration Interfered, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, July 10, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=11854247.
122. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA. From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 92.
123. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
124. Id. at 866.
125. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2626-27 (2006).
126. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
127. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2005).
128. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
129. Id. at 865.
130. But see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 50-51 (2006) (arguing, contrary to conventional wisdom, that agency policymaking may be more conducive to transparency and political accountability than White House policymaking).
131. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (granting authority to the U.S. Tax Court to construe statutes and rules);
132. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (authorizing the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an independent body that promulgates binding guidelines);
133. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (authorizing the creation of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute "free from executive supervision");
134. see also Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 74, at 813 (observing that the President's "supervisory power over agencies... is largely limited to executive departmental agencies").
135. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 736 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer].
136. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 90, at 50;
137. Merrill, supra note 22, at 996 ("[I]t is simply unrealistic, given the vastness of the federal bureaucracy, to expect that the President or his principal lieutenants can effectively monitor the policymaking activities of all federal agencies.");
138. Strauss, Overseer, supra note 92, at 754.
139. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2598.
140. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that the common law is "not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified").
141. Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 74, at 814 (demonstrating the tension between majoritarianism and expertise in agency policymaking);
142. see also Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 249 (1993).
143. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 463-64, 503-15 (2003) (arguing that a focus on accountability to legitimize agency interpretation "overlooks the ever-present risk of arbitrariness").
144. See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1449 ("Procedural formality, whether imposed under constitutional law or administrative law, always has been a necessary feature of governmental legitimacy.").
145. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 284 (2006) (arguing that the White House cannot compel agencies to adopt a particular statutory interpretation in contexts where Congress has committed the decision to an agency administrator by express statutory command);
146. Strauss, Overseer, supra note 92, at 704-05 ("[W]here Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President's role... is that of overseer and not decider.").
147. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 3, at 1112;
148. see also E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VLLL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2005).
149. See Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2587-88, 2595.
150. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "a background rule of law against which Congress legislates" is that "[a]mbiguity means Congress intended agency discretion");
151. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 3, at 2297-2301.
152. See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 484-86 (1986).
153. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
154. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 388.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 387-88.
158. Id. at 388.
159. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 4, at 15.
160. Id. at 10, 137;
161. see also Rawls, Domain, supra note 4, at 239.
162. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1987) [hereinafter Rawls, Overlapping Consensus] ("Given the fact of pluralism, and given that justification begins from some consensus, no general and comprehensive doctrine can assume the role of a publicly acceptable basis of political justice.").
163. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 4, at 10.
164. Id. at 134;
165. Rawls, Domain, supra note 4, at 239.
166. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 4, at 11.
167. Id. at 147.
168. Id.
169. Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 112, at 2.
170. See id.
171. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 148.
172. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 5, at 37;
173. see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely-Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1736 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Agreements] (explaining that when judges "disagree on an abstraction, they move to a level of greater particularity" to reach a particular outcome).
174. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 5, at 47 (quoting Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 4, at 46).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2007, at 50, 50, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html.
177. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 240 (1999) (listing Stevens alongside other judicial pragmatists such as Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, White, and Breyer);
178. Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE 157, 177-79 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003);
179. Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens's Free Speech Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2201 (2006).
180. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
181. Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
182. Compare id. at 607-28 (finding physical presence sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction),
183. with id. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (proposing "minimum contacts" as the appropriate standard).
184. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
185. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
186. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (stating that "express delegation" exists when Congress "explicitly le[aves] a gap for the agency to fill").
187. See id. at 844, 865 (remarking that Congress gave deference to agencies because "those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision" would be better able to do so than Congress).
188. See id. at 865 (indicating that the President's direct accountability to the people makes it appropriate for the executive branch - including administrative agencies - to make policy decisions).
189. See id. at 845 (arguing that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer").
190. Id. at 865.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 73, at 368;
194. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517;
195. Panel Discussion, supra note 70.
196. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) ("Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.").
197. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Justice of Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive Claims of Independent Authority To Interpret the Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157. 158-59 (2005) (describing "the legal realist view that assigning legal meaning is a choice of policy" as the "dominant paradigm" since Chevron);
198. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2583 (characterizing Chevron as "a natural and proper outgrowth of... the legal realist attack on the autonomy of legal reasoning").
199. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron rests, at least in part, on the executive's inherent lawmaking authority);
200. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 3, at 2297-2301.
201. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
202. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 138 (advocating a deliberative democracy conception of Chevron that requires an agency to "persuasively explain its interpretation" to the public).
203. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (expressing separation-of-powers concerns);
204. Shapiro, supra note 57, at 941-56;
205. Tyler, supra note 57, at 1430.
206. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 224-26 (2006).
207. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32 (denying Chevron deference where there is no congressional delegation of authority to the agency).
208. See generally Sunstein, Agreements, supra note 121 (discussing the mechanics of incompletely theorized agreements in other settings).
209. See Hickman, supra note 23, at 1550 ("Scholars posited a variety of legal foundations for Chevron including not only congressional delegation but others ranging from constitutional requirement to mere judicial policy. Changing Chevron's underlying premise alters the scope of the doctrine's applicability.");
210. Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. Rev. 997, 1005 (2007) (commenting that the "different explanations for deference" in Chevron prompted scholars "to debate Chevron's legal underpinnings").
211. See supra Part I.B.
212. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
213. Id. at 221.
214. Id. at 227.
215. Id. at 229. Justice Breyer paved the way for this "additional reason" theory a year earlier when he argued in an influential dissent that Chevron "simply focused upon an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to make those determinations."
216. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
217. see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 872, noted in Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.11.
218. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984)).
219. See id. at 226-27.
220. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
221. Id. at 140, quoted in Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
222. Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2637 (2003);
223. see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006) (emphasizing the congressional delegation inquiry).
224. Garrett, supra note 158, at 2637.
225. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 753.
226. See Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2590 (arguing that when congressional delegation is "explored on a case-by-case basis,... it is likely that courts will be unable to find any clear expression of congressional will to that effect"). The Chevron decision itself expressed skepticism in drawing inferences about congressional intent from statutory text.
227. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 861 (1984) ("We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.").
228. See, e.g., Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1212 (1990).
229. See, e.g., Steven Croley, The Applicability of the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 103, 115 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (arguing that Mead compounds the delegation fiction by construing notice-and-comment procedures as evidence of congressional intent);
230. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2589-94.
231. See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1448 (arguing that Mead's rationale has spawned uncertainty and confusion);
232. Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 751 (arguing that the congressional delegation's fictional character makes it too easy for courts to infer delegation depending on how they want to decide a given case);
233. Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 772, 782 (2002) (criticizing Mead for endorsing a "daunting set of abstractions" and arguing that the Chevron/Skidmore distinction has "no functional justification").
234. Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or Detrimental to Its Growth?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 249, 251 (1893).
235. Id.
236. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-29 (2001).
237. Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added);
238. see also id. at 231 n.13.
239. Id. at 238 n.19;
240. cf. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2006) (deferring to a Coast Guard determination that particular vessels represented a "high risk" of terrorist attack because the relevant security plan was "approved at a national level by the Coast Guard Commandant").
241. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
242. Id. at 232-33.
243. Id. at 222 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1500(b) (2000)).
244. Id. at 230.
245. Id. at 231-32.
246. Id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fairness to Justice Scalia, many of the Supreme Court's pre-Mead decisions did treat statutory gaps as prima facie evidence of congressional delegation.
247. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988) (holding that "a reviewing court must give deference" to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute where Congress "is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue"). On the other hand, the Court had also withheld deference in other cases where it found "reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended... an implicit delegation." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). For example, the Court declined to defer to: agency litigation positions,
248. see, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988); interpretations raising "serious constitutional concerns,"
249. see, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
250. U.S. 159, 172 (2001), and Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); and so-called "major questions" that Congress would be unlikely to delegate to agency policymakers,
251. see, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)).
252. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 243.
254. Id. at 245.
255. Id. at 251.
256. See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Following Mead, the continuum of agency deference has been fraught with ambiguity.");
257. Cal. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that Mead has "further obscured the already murky administrative law surrounding Chevron").
258. See Mead, 533 U.S.at 231.
259. See id. at 231-33.
260. These forty-three cases were identified through a search of the Westlaw database in January 2008.
261. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350-51 (2007) (granting Chevron deference);
262. Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2007) (granting Chevron deference based on congressional delegation);
263. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1540-41 (2007) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation and expertise);
264. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-69 (2006) (denying Chevron deference based on lack of delegation and expertise);
265. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-86 (2005) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation);
266. Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238-39 (2004) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation);
267. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487-88 (2004) (denying Chevron deference to internal guidance memoranda since it "lack[s] the force of law");
268. Wash. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 383 n.6 (2003) (denying Chevron deference to a Social Security Administration internal manual since it was not "a product of formal rulemaking);
269. Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation);
270. Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11 n.6 (2002) (denying Chevron deference to EEOC compliance manual due to poor agency deliberative process);
271. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501-02 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation and expertise);
272. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on expertise and deliberative rationality);
273. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 n.5 (2002) (denying Chevron deference based, in part, on lack of agency deliberation);
274. Wis. Dep't of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 497 (2002) (granting only Skidmore deference to proposed Medicaid rule despite finding both congressional delegation and administrative expertise).
275. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2007);
276. Raymond B. Yates Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004);
277. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-26 (2003);
278. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002);
279. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18-20 (2002);
280. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002).
281. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 n.26 (2007);
282. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006);
283. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2003);
284. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002);
285. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2002);
286. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002);
287. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320-21 n.45 (2001).
288. See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2781 n.18 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring);
289. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2515 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring);
290. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
291. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2007);
292. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 70 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
293. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243-47, 264-67 (2005);
294. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
295. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 269 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
296. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004);
297. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003);
298. Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 809 (2003);
299. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 680-81 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring);
300. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 472 (2002);
301. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazbal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002);
302. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002);
303. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan v. Matz, 533 U.S. 925, 925 (2001).
304. See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258.
305. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
306. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
307. Id. at 214 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000)).
308. Id. at 221-22.
309. Id. at 222 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001);
310. KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 1.7, 3.3 (3d ed. 1994)).
311. Id. at 215.
312. 127 S.Ct. 2339 (2007).
313. Id. at 2345 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. Id. at 2346.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 2347.
317. Id. at 2346.
318. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)).
319. Id. at 2350.
320. Id.
321. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
322. Id. at 268.
323. Id. at 255-56, 259.
324. Id. at 262-63 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 744 (1973)).
325. Id. at 253-54.
326. Id. at 266-67 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991)).
327. Id. at 267;
328. cf. Am. Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469-71 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
329. Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule have argued that Gonzales and other recent Supreme Court decisions reflect a movement away from a political accountability model and toward a renewed focus on agency expertise.
330. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 83, at 54. More accurately, perhaps, Gonzales and other recent cases suggest that both rationales must be satisfied to trigger Chevron deference.
331. 534 U.S. 473 (2002).
332. Id. at 478.
333. Id. at 484-85 (citing Chi. Reg'l State Letter No. 22-94 from the Health Care Fin. Admin. (July 1994), reprinted in Petition and Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 87a, Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952);
334. Chi. Reg'l State Letter No. 51-93 from the Health Care Fin. Admin. (Dec. 1993), reprinted in Petition and Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 78a, Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952)).
335. Blumer, 534 U.S. at 485.
336. Id. at 478.
337. Id. at 496.
338. Id. at 485 (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 46,763, 46,765 (2001)).
339. Id. at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1995)).
340. Id.
341. Although Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia dissented, all nine Justices agreed that Skidmore, not Chevron, provided the appropriate standard of deference. See id. at 505 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)) (arguing that the Secretary's position was "devoid of any 'power to persuade'" under Skidmore because the Secretary had expressed different views over time). Blumer thus challenges the assumption that Chevron's overlapping rationales are merely redundant, as some scholars have suggested.
342. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 690 (2007) (arguing that when tensions arise between agency expertise and political accountability, "the executive may pursue either a technocratic course or a political one; on the logic of Chevron, either approach is permissible"). The better reading of Chevron and Mead is that none of the overlapping rationales for deference is truly redundant; a single faulty thread in Chevron's consensus compromises the integrity of the whole weave.
343. See, e.g., De La Mota v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2005).
344. 127 S. Ct. 1513 (2007).
345. Id. at 1516 (holding that "the FCC's application of § 201(b) [of the Communications Act of 1934] to the carrier's refusal to pay compensation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute").
346. Id. at 1522 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005)).
347. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 2 (William S. Hein & Co. 2007) (1930).
348. See H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "AS IF" 39-42 (C.K. Ogden trans., 2d ed. 935) (1924) (discussing "heuristic fictions").
349. Breyer, supra note 73, at 370 ("[Courts] have looked to practical features of the particular circumstance to decide whether it 'makes sense,' in terms of the need for fair and efficient administration of that statute in light of its substantive purpose, to imply a congressional intent that courts defer to the agency's interpretation.");
350. Scalia, supra note 138, at 517 ("[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents merely a fiction, presumed intent, and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.").
351. Scalia, supra note 138, at 517.
352. See Breyer, supra note 73, at 371 ("Using these factors as a means of discerning a hypothetical congressional intent about 'deference'... allows courts to allocate the law-interpreting function between court and agency in a way likely to work best within any particular statutory scheme.").
353. Scalia, supra note 138, at 517;
354. see also Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron - The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 824 (1990) (stating that Congress's awareness of Chevron and distrust of "executive branch interpretation" should lead Congress to be more careful in its drafting).
355. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 798 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Deference];
356. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 824 (2002) (arguing that the congressional delegation fiction "has resuscitated the axiom that Congress is the primary source of authority to make law within our system of separation of powers");
357. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1439-40 (2007).
358. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 37 (1967).
359. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
360. See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1445-47 (identifying inconsistencies in circuit courts' application of Mead and concluding that Chevron's domain now hinges on whatever particular factors "the first panel to evaluate a particular interpretive procedure" deigns to select);
361. Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen; What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1877, 1895-96 (2006).
362. JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 283 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1843).
363. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 35 (MacMillan Co. 1921) (1909).
364. FULLER, supra note 231, at 70;
365. see also Vaihinger, supra note 225, at 88.
366. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
367. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 513 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)) ("Congressional delegation to an administrative agency... may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rule-making, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.").
368. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987));
369. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-19 (1992);
370. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988));
371. see also Croley, supra note 163, at 106-07 (discussing Chevron's applicability to formal adjudications).
372. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
373. Id. at 418 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 307, 110 Stat. 3009-612 (1996)).
374. Id. at 424 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (Supp. III 1994) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2000))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
375. Id. at 425 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998) (current version at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(i) (2008))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
376. Id. (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
377. But see Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1682 (2007) (discussing circuit courts' reluctance to grant Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretations of law based on skepticism about the BIA's expertise).
378. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
379. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(b), 555(b), 556(d), 557(c) (2000) (mandating that, under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), agencies must provide notice to persons potentially affected by the agency's action, allow for the presentation of evidence in oral or documentary form, permit cross-examination by participating parties, and base findings and conclusions of fact exclusively on record evidence).
380. Examples include administrative law judges within the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission ("FMSHRC") and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC"). See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991) (holding that the OSHRC was not entitled to deference because Congress had committed policymaking authority to another agency body, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
381. See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (denying Chevron deference to the Department of Health and Human Services' interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act, a statute of general applicability, because the agency lacked expertise).
382. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-80, 482 (1999) (denying Chevron deference where the statute was administered by multiple federal agencies).
383. But see Individual Reference Servs. Group v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2001) (granting Chevron deference where agencies authored a coordinated interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term). Some circuits have elevated the uniformity inquiry by framing Chevron as an inquiry into whether the agency interpretation would have decisive precedential value within the agency.
384. See, e.g., Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzalez, 449 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006)). Even these courts have recognized, however, that precedential uniformity is insufficient for Chevron deference unless other factors are satisfied, such as the administrator's "imprimatur" of authority.
385. Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 922 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 100.3(d)(1) (2006)) (describing an immigration judge's decision as "without precedential value and without the imprimatur of the Attorney General or the Attorney General's delegate");
386. see also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001).
387. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 227 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The SSA's recently enacted regulations emerged from notice-and-comment rulemaking and merit deference. No more need be said.");
388. Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
389. See, e.g., Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1379-82 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting Chevron deference to a Commerce Department antidumping determination).
390. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 (citing Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1472-73 (1992)). Compare Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (granting deference to an interpretive rule issued by the Secretary of the Interior), with Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (1991) (stating that "interpretive rules" are not entitled to the same level of "deference as norms that derive from the exercise of... delegated lawmaking powers" (citations omitted)).
391. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
392. See id. at 230;
393. cf. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) ("Of course we deny deference 'to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.' The deliberateness of such positions, if not indeed their authoritativeness, is suspect." (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988))).
394. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
395. Criddle, supra note 25, at 1930-33;
396. see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note 25, at 1248-49 (arguing that courts cannot reasonably infer a delegation of interpretive authority to the executive branch in contexts where treaties or customary norms operate as constraints upon executive authority).
397. Kahan, supra note 24, at 474 (explaining that Congress allows for ambiguity in federal criminal statutes and is "perfectly aware that this approach [shifts] a great deal of law-defining authority to courts").
398. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 265 (1986). For example, judges and scholars who defend Chevron as an extension of the President's constitutional powers would likely oppose a consensus-based approach to Chevron deference.
399. Professor Bressman has argued in a similar vein that courts should "simply... acknowledge that Chevron is based on a fiction about congressional intent in the service of broader democratic values." Bressman, Deference, supra note 230, at 765.
400. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (footnote omitted).
401. But see Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1979) (arguing that the law's legitimacy depends more on perception than reality and that a judicial system's "paramount" objective may be simply to provide an "authoritative resolution" to disputes).
402. Smith, supra note 230, at 1482.
403. Id. at 1482-83.
404. See Diver, supra note 74, at 575 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-65 (2d ed. 1969)) ("As Lon Fuller has argued, the 'internal morality' of law requires that it be comprehensible to those whose conduct it regulates.").
405. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
406. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 825-27.
407. JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government, in cOLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 511 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1977) (1838);
408. see also JEREMY BENTHAM, LETTERS ON SCOTCH REFORM (1808), reprinted in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3, 13 (John Bowring ed., 1962) ("Fiction [in law is] a willful falsehood, uttered by a judge, for the purpose of giving to injustice the colour of justice.").
409. 547 U.S. 715(2006).
410. Id. at 754 n.14 (paraphrasing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 28-29 (1973)). In Chevron itself, Justice Stevens cited Roscoe Pound's assertion that the very concept of "interpretation" could be characterized as a "general fiction" insofar as it obscures a court's prescriptive function.
411. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.10 (1984) (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 174-75 (1921)).
412. See Moglen & Pierce, supra note 162, at 1210, 1213-15;
413. Smith, supra note 230, at 1470 (characterizing as "new legal fictions" the utilization of over-inclusive socio-political factual presumptions to obscure contestable normative judgments).
414. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 144, at 456;
415. Tyler, supra note 57, at 1430.
416. Moglen & Pierce, supra note 162, at 1213;
417. see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 167 (Tudor Publ'g Co. 1936) (1930) ("[Jjudges have failed to see ... that, in a sense, all legal rules, principles, precepts, concepts, standards - all generalized statements of law - are fictions.");
418. FULLER, supra note 231, at 2.
419. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1247, 1256 (1990) (arguing that legal fictions "are not indispensable" but are rather "obstacles to thought" and should be replaced with "interpretive principles - ones that can be defended in substantive or institutional terms").
420. R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290, 313, 315 (1981).