The political economy of fiscal deficits: A survey

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 645-673

  Eslava, Marcela ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Venezuela)

Author keywords

Fiscal deficits; Fiscal policy; Political economy

Indexed keywords

BUDGET DEFICIT; FISCAL POLICY; FUTURE PROSPECT; GOVERNMENT; POLITICAL CONFLICT; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 79960596666     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: 14676419     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2010.00647.x     Document Type: Article

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