Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

European Economic Review

Volumn 50, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 1403-1439

  Alt, James E ^a   Lassen, David Dreyer ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Budget transparency; Budgetary institutions; Fiscal policy; Fiscal transparency; Government debt; Government deficits; Political economy

Indexed keywords

BUDGET DEFICIT; DEBT; FISCAL POLICY; OECD; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL INTEGRATION; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 33745278099     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001     Document Type: Article

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