Capitalism, not globalism: Capital mobility, central bank independence, and the political control of the economy

Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-210

  Clark, William Roberts ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84898282608     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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