The case for restricting fiscal policy discretion

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 118, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 1419-1447

  Fatás, Antonio ^a   Mihov, Ilian ^a  

^a INSEAD   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344153930     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355303322552838     Document Type: Article

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