Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 39-52

  Drazen, Allan ^a,b,c   Eslava, Marcela ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c CEPR ^*

^d UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Colombia; Elections; Expenditure composition; Political budget cycle

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; MODELING; PUBLIC SPENDING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

COLOMBIA;

EID: 76049125462     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001     Document Type: Article

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