Electoral and partisan cycles in fiscal policy: An examination of Canadian provinces

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 8, Issue 5-6, 2001, Pages 753-774

  Kneebone, Ronald D ^a   Mckenzie, Kenneth J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Partisan and opportunistic effects; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038842496     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012895211073     Document Type: Article

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