Fiscal Governance in Europe

Fiscal Governance In Europe

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-234

  Hallerberg, Mark ^a   Strauch, Rolf Rainer ^b   Von Hagen, Jürgen ^c  

^a HERTIE SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE   (Germany)

^b EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925141570     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511759505     Document Type: Book

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