The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 612-627

  Sokolyk, Tatyana ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitakeover provisions; Corporate governance; G Index; Mergers and acquisitions; Takeover premium

Indexed keywords

EID: 79954609486     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.10.005     Document Type: Article

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