Shareholder rights, boards, and CEO compensation

Review of Finance

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 81-113

  Fahlenbrach, Rdiger ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58449116370     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfn011     Document Type: Article

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