Have changing takeover defense rules and strategies entrenched management and damaged shareholders? The case of defeated takeover bids

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 16-37

  Ryngaert, Michael ^a   Scholten, Ralph ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

^b Cornerstone Research ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Takeovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 71349085646     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.09.002     Document Type: Article

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