Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 535-555

  Harford, Jarrad ^a   Mansi, Sattar A ^b   Maxwell, William F ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b PAMPLIN COLLEGE OF BUSINESS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisitions; Cash holdings; Corporate governance; Ownership structure; Take over Provisions

Indexed keywords

EID: 40849133912     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.04.002     Document Type: Article

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