Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder?

Journal of Finance

Volumn 55, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 2599-2640

  Schwert, G William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040211631     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00301     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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