Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 501-529

  Faleye, Olubunmi ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Classified boards; Executive compensation; Managerial entrenchment

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846508475     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.005     Document Type: Article

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