Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 656-677

  Bates, Thomas W ^a   Becher, David A ^b   Lemmon, Michael L ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b DREXEL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisition; Antitakeover provisions; Boards; Classified board; Corporate governance; Directors; Merger; Staggered board; Takeovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 40849094618     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.007     Document Type: Article

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