Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 221-232

  Carpenter, Jeffrey ^a   Bowles, Samuel ^b,c   Gintis, Herbert ^b,d   Hwang, Sung Ha ^e  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

^b SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^d CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

^e UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiment; Public good; Punishment; Strong reciprocity; Team production

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349239701     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.011     Document Type: Article

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