Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 458-469

  Burks, Stephen ^a,b   Carpenter, Jeffrey ^b,c   Goette, Lorenz ^b,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b IZA   (Germany)

^c MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

^d FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation schemes; Field experiment; Social preferences; Sorting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859752902     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.012     Document Type: Article

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