Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 312-341

  Legros, Patrick ^a   Newman, Andrew F ^b  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030209578     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0092     Document Type: Article

References (35)

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