Chapter 10 Wealth inequality, wealth constraints and economic performance

Handbook of Income Distribution

Volumn 1, Issue , 2000, Pages 541-603

  Bardhan, Pranab ^a   Bowles, Samuel ^b   Gintis, Herbert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

D3; distribution; Efficient wealth redistribution; H1; inequality and common pool resources; inequality and risk aversion; mutual monitoring and team production; structure and scope of government

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350192235     PISSN: 15740056     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0056(00)80013-5     Document Type: Review

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