The evolution of strong reciprocity: Cooperation in heterogeneous populations

Theoretical Population Biology

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 17-28

  Bowles, Samuel ^a,b   Gintis, Herbert ^a,c,d  

^a SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruistic punishment; Human cooperation; Multi level selection; Strong reciprocity

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; RECIPROCITY; RELATEDNESS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ANIMALIA;

EID: 0347694648     PISSN: 00405809     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001     Document Type: Article

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