Coalitions

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 11, Issue , 2008, Pages 351-386

  Humphreys, Macartan ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Commitments; Contracts; Cooperative; Nash program; Noncooperative

Indexed keywords

EID: 47549083943     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.062206.091849     Document Type: Article

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