Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 83-114

  Maskin, Eric ^a   Tirole, Jean ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17944377188     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00079     Document Type: Article

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