A general bargaining model of legislative policy-making

Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 49-85

  Banks, Jeffrey S ^a   Duggan, John ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745865042     PISSN: 15540626     EISSN: 15540634     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1561/100.00000001     Document Type: Article

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