Demand commitment in legislative bargaining

American Political Science Review

Volumn 101, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 847-850

  Montero, Maria ^a   Vidal Puga, Juan J ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIGO   (Spain)

^c Research Group of Economic Analysis (RGEA)   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048965797     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055407070517     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting. 2005. Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments. American Journal of Political Science 49 (July): 550-63.
2. Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks. 1988. Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review 82 (June): 405-22.
3. Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review 87 (December): 34-47.
4. Montero, Maria, and Juan-J. Vidal-Puga. 2006. Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games. CeDEx Discussion Paper 2006-11.
5. Morelli, Massimo. 1999. Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining. American Political Science Review 93 (December): 809-20.
6. Morelli, Massimo, and Maria Montero. 2003. The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games, Games and Economic Behavior 42 (January): 137-55.
7. Peleg, Bezalel. 1968. On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 16 (May): 527-32.