A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 153-160

  Coughlan, Peter J ^a   Le Breton, Michel ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Binary voting procedure; Condorcet social choice function; Implementation via backward induction; Majority rule tournament; Ultimate uncovered set

Indexed keywords

EID: 47549093995     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050030     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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