An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 50-76

  Bergin, James ^a   Duggan, John ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001922334     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2505     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Abreu D., Sen A. Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition. J. Econ. Theory. 50:1990;285-299.
2. Aliprantis C., Border K. Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker's Guide. 1994;Springer-Verlag, New York.
3. Aumann R. The core of a cooperative game without side payments. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 98:1961;539-552.
4. Aumann R., Peleg B. Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 66:1960;173-179.
5. Bagnoli M., Lipman B. Provision of public goods: Fully implementing the core through private contributions. Rev. Econ. Stud. 56:1989;583-601.
6. Bergin J. A model of strategic behavior in repeated games. J. Math. Econ. 21:1992;113-153.
7. Billera L. On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets. J. Math. Econ. 1:1974;129-139.
8. Billera L., Bixby R. A characterization of polyhedral market games. Int. J. Game Theory. 2:1973;253-261.
9. Billera L., Bixby R. Market representations of n-person games. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 80:1974;522-526.
10. Bossert W., Tan G. An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution. Soc. Choice Welfare. 12:1995;29-41.
11. Chatterjee K., Dutta B., Ray D., Sengupta K. A non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining. Rev. Econ. Stud. 60:1993;463-477.
12. Conley J., Wilkie S. Implementing the Nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems. Econ. Design. 1:1995;205-216.
13. Debreu G. A social equilibrium existence theorem. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S. 38:1952;886-893.
14. J. Duggan, Implementing social welfare optima when there is a private good, 1997.
15. Dutta B., Sen A., Vohra R. Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments. Econ. Design. 1:1995;173-204.
16. E. Einy, D. Wettstein, A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets and the core, 1993.
17. Gul F. Bargaining foundations of Shapley value. Econometrica. 57:1989;81-95.
18. Harsanyi J. An equilibrium-point interpretation of stable sets and a proposed alternative definition. Management Sci. 20:1974;1472-1495.
19. Hart S., MasColell A. Bargaining and value. Econometrica. 64:1996;357-380.
20. Howard J. A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium. J. Econ. Theory. 56:1992;142-159.
21. Ichiishi T. The Cooperative Nature of the Firm. 1993;Cambridge Univ. Press, New York.
22. Ichiishi T. A social coalitional equilibrium existence lemma. Econometrica. 49:1981;369-377.
23. Jackson M. Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded mechanisms. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59:1992;757-776.
24. Jackson M., Palfrey T., Srivastava S. Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms. Games Econ. Behav. 6:1994;474-501.
25. Kalai E., Postlewaite A., Roberts J. A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations. J. Econ. Theory. 20:1979;13-22.
26. Lagunoff R. A simple non-cooperative core story. Games Econ. Behav. 7:1994;54-61.
27. Maschler M., Owen G. The consistent Shapley value for games without side payments. Rational Interaction. 1992;Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
28. Mas-Colell A. A further result on the representation of games by markets. J. Econ. Theory. 10:1975;117-122.
29. E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, 1977.
30. E. Miyagawa, Implementation of the normalized utilitarian bargaining solution, 1997.
31. Moldovanu B., Winter E. Order independent equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 9:1995;21-34.
32. Moore J., Repullo R. Subgame perfect implementation. Econometrica. 56:1988;1191-1220.
33. Moore J., Repullo R. Nash implementation: A full characterization. Econometrica. 58:1990;1083-1100.
34. Moulin H. Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. J. Econ. Theory. 33:1984;32-45.
35. Nash J. The bargaining problem. Econometrica. 18:1950;155-162.
36. Nash J. Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica. 21:1953;128-140.
37. Okada A., Winter E. A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core. DP 421. 1995;Kyoto Institute of Economic Research.
38. Perry M., Reny P. A non-cooperative view of coalition formation and the core. Econometrica. 62:1994;795-817.
39. Rosenthal R. Cooperative games in effectiveness form. J. Econ. Theory. 5:1972;88-101.
40. Rubinstein A. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica. 50:1982;97-109.
41. Saijo T., Tatamitani Y., Yamato T. Toward natural implementation. Int. Econ. Rev. 37:1996;949-980.
42. Scarf H. On the existence of a cooperative solution for a general class ofn. J. Econ. Theory. 3:1971;169-181.
43. Selten R. A non-cooperative model of characteristic function bargaining. Bohm V., Nachtkamp H. H. Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. 1981;Bibliographisches Institut, Mannheim.
44. Serrano R. Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case. Int. J. Game Theory. 22:1993;345-357.
45. Serrano R. A market to implement the core. J. of Econ. Theory. 67:1995;285-294.
46. Serrano R. A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation. Econ. Lett. 55:1996;203-208.
47. Serrano R., Vohra R. Non-cooperative implementation of the core. Soc. Choice Welfare. 14:1997;513-525.
48. Shapley L., Shubik M. On market games. J. Econ. Theory. 1:1969;9-25.
49. Shubik M. Game Theory in the Social Sciences, Concepts and Solutions. 1982;MIT Press, Cambridge.
50. Y. Sprumont, On the game-theoretic structure of public-good economies, CRDE and Université de Montréal, 1995.
51. Wilson R. Competitive exchange. Econometrica. 46:1987;577-585.