Transaction costs and coalition stability under majority rule

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 193-207

  Johnson, Ronald N ^a   Libecap, Gary D ^b  

^a Unit 38   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038375016     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbg001     Document Type: Article

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