Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers

Economic Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 97-113

  Konishi, Hideo ^a   Le Breton, Michel ^b   Weber, Shlomo ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031539413     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213445     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Aumann, R. J.: Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In: Contributions to the theory of games, Vol. IV. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1959
2. Bernheim, D., Peleg, B., Whinston M.: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria: I concepts. Journal of Economic Theory 42, 1-12 (1987)
3. Borm, P., Tijs, S. H.: Strategic claim games corresponding to NTU-games. Games and Economic Behavior 4, 58-71 (1992)
4. Borm, P., Otten, G-J., Peters, H.: Core implementation in modified strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria. Tilburg University Discussion Paper, 1992
5. Demange, G., Henriet, D.: Sustainable oligopolies. Journal of Economic Theory 54, 417-428 (1991)
6. Demange, G.: Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures. Journal of Mathematical Economics 23, 45-58 (1994)
7. Greenberg, J., Weber, S.: Multiparty equilibria under proportional representation. American Political Science Review 79, 693-703 (1985)
8. Greenberg, J., Weber, S.: Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain. Journal of Economic Theory 38, 101-117 (1986)
9. Greenberg, J.: Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system. Journal of Economic Theory 49, 195-202 (1989)
10. Greenberg, J., Weber, S.: State coalition structures with unidimensional set of alternatives. Journal of Economic Theory 60, 62-82 (1993)
11. Guesnerie, R., Oddou, C.: Second best taxation as a game. Journal of Economic Theory 60, 67-91 (1981)
12. Ichiishi, T.: The cooperative nature of the firm. London: Cambridge University Press 1993
13. Kalai, E., Postlewaite, A., Roberts, J.: A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations. Journal of Economic Theory 20, 13-22 (1979)
14. Kahn, C. M., Mookherjee, D.: The good, the bad and the ugly: coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games. Games and Economic Behavior 4, 101-121 (1992)
15. Kaneko, M., Wooders, M. H.: Cores of partitioning games. Mathematical Social Sciences 3, 313-327 (1982)
16. Konishi, H., Le Breton, M., Weber, S.: Equilibrium in a model with partial rivalry. Forthcoming Journal of Economic Theory 1995a
17. Konishi, H., Le Breton, M., Weber, S.: Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with positive externalities. Working Paper, Richard B. Johnson Center for Economic Studies at Southern Methodist University, 1995b
18. Le Breton, M., Owen, G., Weber, S.: Strongly balanced cooperative games. International Journal of Game Theory 20, 419-427 (1992)
19. Peleg, B.: Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees. London: Cambridge University Press 1984
20. Scarf, H.: The core of an N-person game. Econometrica 35, 50-69 (1967)
21. Thomson, W.: Population monotonic allocation rules. In: A. Barnett, M. Salles, H. Moulin and N. Schofield (eds.) Social choice, welfare and ethics. London: Cambridge University Press 1994
22. Wako, J.: Coalition-proofness the competitive allocations in a market with indivisible goods. Gakushuin University Discussion Paper, 1994