Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 116, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 933-967

  Baron, David P ^a   Diermeier, Daniel ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039191747     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/00335530152466278     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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