Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance

Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-325

  Correia da Silva, Luis ^a   Goergen, Marc ^b   Renneboog, Luc ^c  

^a OXERA Consulting Ltd   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Corporate Control; Corporate Governance; Corporate Ownership; Germany; UK; US

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644759528     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199259305.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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