Financial intermediation with risk aversion

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 719-742

  Hellwig, Martin F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0742334200     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00151     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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