Asymmetric information, managerial opportunism, financing, and payout policies

Journal of Finance

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 637-660

  Noe, Thomas H ^a   Rebello, Michael J ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039015451     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb02697.x     Document Type: Article

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