The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 397-446

  Jenkinson, Tim ^a,b   Ljungqvist, Alexander ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Banks; Block trades; Corporate governance; G32; Germany; Takeovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001677548     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00034-7     Document Type: Article

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