Blocks, liquidity, and corporate control

Journal of Finance

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 1-25

  Bolton, Patrick ^a   Von Thadden, Ernst Ludwig ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010106826     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.15240     Document Type: Article

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