The link between dividend policy and institutional ownership

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 105-122

  Short, Helen ^a   Zhang, Hao ^a   Keasey, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Dividend policy; Institutional ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036183712     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00030-X     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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