Insider control by large investor groups and managerial disciplining in listed Belgian companies

Managerial Finance

Volumn 26, Issue 10, 2000, Pages 22-41

  Goergen, Marc ^a   Renneboog, Luc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Accounting research; Belgium; Corporate governance; Corporate ownership; Directors; Top management

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042274876     PISSN: 03074358     EISSN: 17587743     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/03074350010766918     Document Type: Article

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