Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 112, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 692-728

  Burkart, Mike ^a   Gromb, Denis ^a   Panunzi, Fausto ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009952280     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355397555325     Document Type: Article

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