Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational

Personality and Individual Differences

Volumn 122, Issue , 2018, Pages 155-163

  Ståhl, Tomas ^a   van Prooijen, Jan Willem ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Analytic cognitive style; Cognitive ability; Conspiracy belief; Epistemic rationality; Importance of rationality; Paranormal belief

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; COGNITION; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; MALE; MOTIVATION; PRECURSOR; SKILL;

EID: 85042159472     PISSN: 01918869     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.026     Document Type: Article

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