The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 188-214

  Pennycook, Gordon ^a   Cheyne, James Allan ^a   Barr, Nathaniel ^a   Koehler, Derek J ^a   Fugelsang, Jonathan A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cognitive ability; Cognitive style; Dual process theories; Moral judgements; Moral values; Religiosity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84894335721     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.865000     Document Type: Article

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