A behavioral study of "noise" in coordination games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 162, Issue , 2016, Pages 195-208

  Mäs, Michael ^a   Nax, Heinrich H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^b ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Behavioral game theory; Discrete choice; Evolution; Learning; Logit response; Stochastic stability; Trial and error

Indexed keywords

EID: 84953302067     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010     Document Type: Article

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