Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 12-13

  Young, H Peyton ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650912809     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.007     Document Type: Note

References (8)

1. Foster Dean P., Young H.Peyton Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theoretical Population Biology 1990, 38:219-232.
2. The Essential John Nash 2002, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. H.W. Kuhn, S. Nasar (Eds.).
3. Maynard Smith John Evolution and the Theory of Games 1982, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
4. Nash John F. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 1950, 18:155-162.
5. Nash John F. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceed. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 1950, 36:48-49.
6. Nash, John. F., 1950c. Non-cooperative games. Ph.D. dissertation. Princeton University.
7. Rubinstein Ariel Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 1982, 50:97-110.
8. Young H.Peyton An evolutionary model of bargaining. J. Econ. Theory 1993, 59:145-168.