The spread of innovations in social networks

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 107, Issue 47, 2010, Pages 20196-20201

  Montanaria, Andrea ^a   Saberi, Amin ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Convergence times; Game dynamics; Markov chain

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER PROGRAM; CONFERENCE PAPER; GAME; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; MONTE CARLO METHOD; ONLINE SYSTEM; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; RECREATION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL NETWORK;

EID: 78650556008     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1004098107     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Schelling T (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior (W.W. Norton, New York).
2. Young HP (2001) Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions (Princeton Univ Press, Cambridge, MA).
3. Kleinberg J (2007) Cascading behavior in networks: Algorithmic and economic issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, eds N Nisan et al. (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, MA).
4. Watts D (2007) Challenging the Influentials Hypothesis. Measuring Word of Mouth, 3 pp:201-211.
5. Kandori M, Mailath H, Rob F (1993) Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61:29-56.
6. Young HP (1993) The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61:57-84.
7. Harsanyi J, Selten R (1998) A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
8. Donsker M, Varadhan S (1976) On the principal eigenvalue of second-order elliptic differential operators. Commun Pur Appl Math 29:595-621.
9. Diaconis P, Saloff-Coste L (1993) Comparison theorems for reversible Markov chains. Ann Appl Probab 3:696-730.
10. Sinclair A, Jerrum M (1989) Approximate counting, uniform generation and rapidly mixing Markov chains. Inf Comput (IANDC) 82:93-133.
11. Ellison G (1993) Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61:1047-1071.
12. Fudenberg D, Levine D (1998) The Theory of Learning in Games (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
13. Blume L (1995) The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision. Game Econ Behav 11:111-145.
14. Skyrms B (2003) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
15. Liggett T (1999) Stochastic Interacting Systems: Contact, Voter, and Exclusion Processes (Springer, New York, NY).
16. McKelvey P, Palfrey T (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Game Econ Behav 10:6-38.
17. Berger N, Kenyon C, Mossel E, Peres Y (2005) Glauber dynamics on trees and hyperbolic graphs. Probab Theory Rel 131:311-340.
18. Neves E, Schonman R (1991) Critical droplets and metastability for a Glauber dynamics at very low temperatures. Commun Math Phys 137:209-230.
19. Bovier A, Manzo F (2002) Metastability in Glauber dynamics in the low-tempersture limit: Beyond exponential asymptotics. J Stat Phys 107:757-779.
20. Olivieri E, Vares ME (2004) Large Deviations and Metastability (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
21. Mihail M, Papadimitriou C, Saberi A (2006) On certain connectivity properties of the Internet topology. J Comput Syst Sci 72:239-251.
22. Gkantsidis C, Mihail M, Saberi A (2003) Throughput and congestion in power-law graphs. Proc of SIGMETRICS 148-159.
23. Flaxman A (2006) Expansion and lack thereof in randomly perturbed graphs. Proc of Web Alg Workshop 4936:24-35.
24. Neves EJ, Schonman RH (1992) Behavior of droplets for a class of Glauber dynamics at very low temperatures. Probab Theory Rel 91:331-354.
25. Young HP (2006) The diffusion of innovation in social networks. The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, III: Current Perspectives and Future Directions (Oxford Univ Press, New York).