Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 135-154

  Germano, Fabrizio ^a   Lugosi, Gábor ^a,b  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b INSTITUCIÓ CATALANA DE RECERCA I ESTUDIS AVANÇATS ICREA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Global convergence to Nash equilibrium; Random search; Regret based learning; Stochastic dynamics; Uncoupled dynamics; Unknown games

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249059755     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.06.001     Document Type: Article

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