Learning to signal with probe and adjust

Episteme

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 139-150

  Skyrms, Brian ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010670332     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2012.5     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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