Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 882-897

  Pradelski, Bary S R ^a   Young, H Peyton ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Completely uncoupled learning; Distributed control; Equilibrium selection; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860611398     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.017     Document Type: Article

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