Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games

Erkenntnis

Volumn 79, Issue S4, 2014, Pages 835-853

  Huttegger, Simon M ^a   Skyrms, Brian ^a   Zollman, Kevin J S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84899942074     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9467-y     Document Type: Article

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